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LAW AND QUANTITATIVE MULTIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS: AN ENCOUNTERf 
Arnold H. Lozowick,* Peter 0. Steiner,** and Roger Miller*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
W ORDS are the lawyer's stock in tirade. He would rather face a page of fine print than a single algebraic formula. A trial 
is the collection of oral testimony, a contract aims at expressing a 
legal undertaking verbally, and that final and highest product of 
the legal profession, the law review article, is an uninterrupted 
stream of words. 
Words, however, are only one way of finding facts, expressing 
relationships, or formulating arguments. Numbers may do so as 
well. For several centuries, scientific disciplines have relied heavily 
on numerical, or quantitative, approaches to the discovery of truth. 
In recent decades the social scientists have turned increasingly to-
ward numerical analysis as an essential tool of their trade. The 
learned journals of the economic profession, for example, often 
seem to regard words as secondary; the substance of the thought of 
the contemporary economist emerges in a series of statistical for-
mulae, tables, and other incantations. The same is increasingly true 
of the political scientist, the sociologist, and the psychologist. 
The social scientist has turned to statistical techniques because 
they permit the investigation of social, economic, and other human 
relationships not subject to laboratory control with the intellectual 
rigor and empirical standards of proof hitherto characteristic only 
of laboratory sciences. One of these techniques, and the subject of 
this Article, is quantitative multivariate analysis. 
The Article attempts to explain the basic approach of quanti-
tative multivariate analysis and to show how it can be applied to 
the solution of legal problems. We will demonstrate that this tech-
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nique can grapple with complex factual questions arising in a legal 
context, and that it can do so in a controlled manner, rather than 
by the accumulation of a mountain of unrelated facts which can be 
utilized only by a leap of intuition. This is the key to our argument: 
It is possible to use numbers and numerical analysis in an ordered 
search for the truth. In this role numbers serve not merely as the 
illustrations of a legal argument, but act as important conditions 
and constraints upon that argument. In deference to the tradition 
we challenge, this Article consists of many words and few numbers; 
but the latter are as important as the former. 
For many lawyers the word "statistics" evokes a sterile numbers 
game such as that which characterizes recent Supreme Court anti-
trust opinions. Many lawyers are disturbed by what they regard as 
the libertine manner in which the Court selects the statistics it will 
use and by its arbitrary determination of the numbers which estab-
lish the defendant's guilt. With a full awareness of the quagmire we 
are entering, we will attempt to show that quantitative analysis can 
assist in the rational solution of a central question of antitrust law: 
the selection of the relevant market in a merger case. If we are cor-
rect in the hypothesis that quantitative analysis can penetrate this 
morass, it deserves the attention of the legal profession. 
This Article chronicles one attempt to blend the sophisticated 
science of statistics with the mysterious art of the law in an anti-
trust case. Once again, we hope to provide lawyers with an under-
standing of a tool which can be used in resolving complex factual 
questions wherever they arise, not merely in an antitrust context. 
Although the lawyer will not emerge from this encounter as an ac-
complished statistician or economist, he may be able to talk to his 
fellow social scientists and to achieve a more fruitful application 
of social science techniques to the law. 
II. THE CONTINENTAL BANK MERGER CASE 
On September I, 1961, the Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Company of Chicago, the second largest bank in Chicago, 
merged with the City National Bank and Trust Company, the sixth 
largest. The surviving bank, Continental, thus became the largest 
in Chicago. This merger was caught in the first flurry of govern-
ment actions brought against bank mergers under the antitrust laws 
-the burst of activity which led to the Supreme Court's Philadel-
phia Bank and Bank of Lexington decisions1 and to the Manufac-
I. United States v. Philadelphia National Bame, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States 
v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 376 U.S. 686 (1964). 
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turers Hanover decision in the Southern District of New York.2 
The Government based its complaint in the Continental Bank case 
on the same statistical approach it employed in those cases-an 
approach which is either simple or simplistic, depending upon one's 
point of view. 
The gist of the Government's case was its contention that Con-
tinental would have an excessive share of the Chicago banking mar-
ket. This argument was buttressed by an assertion that the concen-
tration of the four largest banks in Chicago was also too high. The 
complaint alleged that the merged bank's market share would rep-
resent 26 per cent of the total deposits of all banks in the city of 
Chicago and 34 per cent of the total deposits of all banks in the 
Chicago central business district. It put the corresponding four-
bank concentration ratios at 64 per cent and 90 per cent respec-
tively. Especially after the Philadelphia Bank case, it was obvious 
that these figures were in the danger zone and that, if the Govern-
ment could support them, the merger would be in real trouble.3 
There was no doubt about the arithmetical accuracy of the Gov-
ernment's figures. They were based on the balance sheets showing 
total deposits and loans which the Chicago banks were required to 
file with bank regulatory agencies. It was possible to show that the 
Government's selection of the relevant geographic market was some-
what narrow. But so long as the same basis of computation was 
used, an expansion of the market to include the entire metropolitan 
area would only have reduced the merged bank's market share to 
a point between 19 per cent and 22 per cent-figures still well 
within the danger zone. 
This Article will demonstrate how the authors proposed to re-
duce Continental's market share for a critical segment of banking 
-loans to businesses-from 27.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent; the four-
bank concentration ratio was similarly reduced from 84.7 per cent 
to 31.6 per cent. These reductions, combined with a similar exam-
ination of other segments of the banking business and a historical 
trend of deconcentration due largely to the successful entry of new 
banks into the Chicago market, placed the Continental Bank case 
in a category by itself-one which we believed would impress even 
the United States Supreme Court. Since the Bank Merger Act of 
2. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). 
3. Before the Philadelphia Bank case, Continental's lawyers were less concerned with 
the numbers. They had patiently explained to the economists why the case did not fall 
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), but instead under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (19(i4). 
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19664 gave its retroactive blessing to the Continental Bank merger, 
no court passed on our presentation.11 Although the saga of a suc-
cessful struggle to defend an antimerger action under section 7 of 
the Clayton Act must await another day, the defense prepared in 
the Continental Bank case does provide us with a case study in 
quantitative multivariate analysis. 
Ill. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM 
The lawyers for Continental began to prepare their case in tra-
ditional fashion: they sat down with their client to be educated 
in the banking business. Even before the Philadelphia Bank case, it 
was no secret that concentration ratios in an appropriately defined 
market would be important. What emerged from these discussions 
was familiar to every banker and to anyone who has worked through 
the district court's opinion in the Manufacturers Hanover case. Even 
if one accepts the Supreme Court's determination in the Philadel-
phia Bank case that the appropriate "line of commerce" in a bank 
merger case is commercial banking, this does no more than elimi-
nate nonbanking financial institutions as relevant competitors. There 
remains the problem of defining the relevant market and develop-
ing measures of concentration therein. The principle measures of 
market structure in the banking industry are bank deposits and 
loans, which are two types of banking services. These bank services, 
however, are not rendered in unitary markets but in a multimarket 
context. Bankers recognize this fact when they speak of "wholesale" 
and "retail" banking. 
"Wholesale" banking, to the banking profession, means the de-
posit, loan, and related services rendered by banks to large business 
enterprises whose resources are great, whose needs are large, and 
whose business activities are usually regional or national in scope. 
In general, the banks that provide "wholesale" banking services 
are large ones; competition among large banks for the business of 
large customers tends to cross local and regional lines. In short, 
bankers believe that the market for "wholesale" banking services 
is nationwide. 
In "retail" banking, on the other hand, the typical customers 
are individuals and small businesses. Such customers use banks for 
personal checking accounts, savings deposits, real estate or auto-
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. II, 1965-1966). 
5. On March 11, 1966, the Continental Bank case was dismissed pursuant to § 2(a) 
of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 10: "Any merger •.• which was consumated 
prior to June 17, 1963 •.. shall be conclusively presumed to have not been in viola-
tion of any antitrust laws other than [section 2 of the Sherman Act]." 
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mobile loans, and small business loans. These small customers cannot 
go very far to obtain banking services; hence only local banks can 
effectively compete with one another in providing such services. In 
other words, the relevant market for "retail" banking services is less 
than nationwide. 
In the Continental Bank case, the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice chose to attack the merger only in the local 
market, recognizing that the merged bank's share of the national 
market was insignificant. However, if the bankers' distinction was 
a valid one, there were good reasons to suppose that Continental's 
share of the local retail market was in fact much smaller than that 
shown by the Government's undiscriminating statistics. Large banks 
have a relatively larger share of the wholesale business than do small 
banks; small banks have a relatively larger share of the retail busi-
ness. Therefore, statistics which combine wholesale and retail trans-
actions would overstate a large bank's share of the retail business. 
Furthermore, Continental's share of the retail market in Chicago 
was probably smaller than that of banks of equivalent size elsewhere 
in the country because Illinois law prohibits branch banking. 6 Con-
tinental' s inability to establish branches in suburban and neighbor-
hood business areas presumably handicapped its retail business. 
Unfortunately, although bankers are convinced that the distinc-
tion is valid, their balance sheet data do not distinguish between 
"wholesale" and "retail" activities; and it was on these balance 
sheets that the Government had built its case. Even if the markets 
were fundamentally different, that business fact was useless to the 
lawyers unless they could separate the markets in the data. Solid 
criteria were needed to give substance to the distinction. And while 
the bankers were certain that the markets really were different, they 
could make neither confident nor precise st~tements about the char-
acteristics which distinguished them. 
In the Manufacturers Hanover case, decided well after our proj-
ect was underway, Judge MacMahon recognized the relevance of 
the retail-wholesale distinction and proposed a single criterion of 
differentiation for business loans. On the basis of the evidence pre-
sented, he concluded that the crucial factor in determining the na-
ture of a given loan transaction was the size of the loan. He then 
found that all business loans of more than $100,000 were made in 
the national, "wholesale" market, and all smaller loans in the local, 
"retail" market.7 
6. ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 16½, § 106 (1963). 
7. 240 F. Supp. 867 at 921. 
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This simple standard, if accepted, would have provided Con-
tinental with an even smaller share of the local market than that 
which resulted from our analysis.8 But this standard rested on no 
firmer a foundation than the strength of Judge MacMahon's in-
tuition. Although his intuition turned out to be good in one case, 
it could not be relied upon to convince another court. It had no 
systematic statistical support of any kind; in an adversary proceed-
ing, even a plausible intuitive standard is always vulnerable. 
IV. THE ECONOMISTS REFORMULATE THE PROBLEM 
At this point Continental's lawyers sought out an academic econ-
omist. To their naive dismay he had no magic formula to describe 
the relevant market and no thermometer to measure the intensity 
of competition in that market. The economist was unembarrassed, 
however, since it is obvious that in these respects his profession 
does not lag behind Congress, the courts, or the Antitrust Division. 
Still, the trip to academe was not wasted. The economist agreed 
that market shares are important in antitrust cases when they can 
be used as proxies for an inherently immeasurable concept-the 
intensity of competition.9 But this will be so only if the "market" 
is a meaningful one. This requires the identification of the groups 
of sellers and buyers of a given product whose relations are suffi-
ciently intertwined to give rise to a market in the product. Al-
though no such identification of sellers and buyers would be airtight, 
not all approximations are equally satisfactory. Although a market 
is ultimately defined geographically, its definition is not a matter 
of mere geography. It is a question of fact: which buyers and sellers 
have access to one another.10 
8. See note 45 infra. 
9. The economist offered the following theoretical formulation of the problem, 
amplifying the intuitive approach of the lawyers and bankers. Any "market share" 
(the fraction of the customers in a market accruing to a particular seller) or "con-
centration ratio" (the aggregate market shares of the group of largest sellers) is in 
the first instance merely an arithmetical concept that might or might not be signifi-
cant in an antitrust case, depending on the substantive standards used in its con-
struction. 
With respect to the sales (or purchases) of a given product or service, the general 
definition of the market share of firm A is 
market share of = sales of firm A of given product to customer group X 
firm A all purchases by customer group X of given product 
It is clear that the market share of a firm can vary enormously as the definition of 
"given product" and of "customer group X" is changed. To take some extreme ex-
amples. Continental Bank's share of business loans to all American borrowers is very 
low; its share of loans to businesses who are its depositors is very high; its share of 
"bank savings deposits" is higher than its share of "bank and savings and loan de-
posits." And so on. 
10. For a discussion of the theoretical issues involved in market definition, see 
Steiner, l,farkets and Industries in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCI• 
ENCES 575 (1968). 
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At this point the economist proposed an interesting experiment. 
Assuming that the bankers' distinction between "wholesale" and 
"retail" banking was a plausible hypothesis, and accepting the law-
yers' view that the retail market was the legally relevant market, the 
economist suggested using observed data about banks and their cus-
tomers to distinguish between "retail" and "wholesale" customers. 
Such a distinction, if tenable, could then be applied to Chicago 
banks and customers, and separate market shares and concentration 
ratios could be computed for retail banking business. These figures 
would presumably be better indicators of the effect of the merger 
on the intensity of competition in the retail market than the Gov-
ernment's balance sheet statistics, which mixed wholesale and retail 
as well as local and nonlocal customers. 
The "experiment" was conducted and is described in detail be-
low. It is worth spelling out our working hypotheses at the start: 
I. The retail customer described by the bankers would find it 
difficult to bank outside of his own locality. He would be, in that 
sense, "locally limited." If we observed such customers, we would 
find them banking locally. 
2. The wholesale customer would be able to bank either inside 
or outside of his own locality. Other things being equal, he might 
find it more convenient to bank locally; but other things would not 
always be equal. He would be what we call a "non-locally limited" 
customer. If we observed such customers, we would find some bank-
ing locally and others banking far from their own locality. 
3. We might therefore sensibly begin our effort to distinguish 
between the retail and the wholesale customer by looking at those 
customers who banked locally and those who did not. The former 
group would include all of the retail customers and some of the 
wholesale ones; the latter group would be limited to the remaining 
wholesale customers. 
4. We hypothesized that the ability of a customer to conduct 
his banking business outside his locality would correlate with mea-
surable characteristics of his business, of the bank, and of the trans-
action. 
In fact, our analysis was to concentrate on business loans-a 
most important segment of the banking business. The first stage 
would be to identify, if we could, those constellations of character-
istics which account for differences between local loans and non-
local loans. Identifying such characteristics would be only the first 
step, since the local-loan category includes some wholesale as well 
as all retail customers. But by isolating the differences between re-
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tail customers and those wholesale customers banking nonlocally, 
we hoped also to provide the basis for the second stage of the anal-
ysis: to distinguish generally between retail (locally limited) and 
wholesale (non-locally limited) customers.11 
V. THE SEARCH FOR DATA 
The anaysis proposed by the economists (by this time there were 
two of them--economists, like lawyers, are prone to run in packs) 
required a substantial quantity of data. We needed information 
about the locations of bank and borrower and various other char-
acteristics of the bank, of the borrower, and of the loan transaction. 
We also required a source of information that covered a very large 
and representative group of transactions. 
The importance of a large body of data as the basis of the ex-
periment requires some emphasis. In the physical sciences an ex-
periment often consists of a limited number of rigorously controlled 
laboratory tests. In chemistry, a specific chemical is added to a spe-
cific mixture of chemicals and other factors, such as temperature, 
are held constant. The chemist then notes a specific reaction. Having 
controlled the factors involved, he has no need to repeat the ex-
periment many times, although some repetition is always desirable 
to offset errors in measurement. The chemist knows that the added 
chemical caused the reaction because all other things were un-
changed. On the other hand, the social scientist is forced to collect 
his experimental data from the real world; in our case data describ-
ing the normal working of banking markets was required. Such 
data would necessarily be the product of an uncontrolled experi-
ment-other things can and do change from case to case. For this 
reason the range of factors that might have produced a given re-
sult was very large indeed. The social scientist who wants to know 
whether there is a "real" (or significant) relationship between fac-
tor A and result B must observe a very large number of cases in 
which factor A is present and a very large number of cases in which 
11. In order to make this distinction clear, consider three bank customers: a small 
manufacturing company ("Tiny Manufacturing Co.'), Sears, Roebuck &: Company, 
and General Motors. From the point of view of a Chicago bank, these customers would 
be classified as follows: 
Location of 
principal office 
Tiny Manufacturing Co. 














not locally limited 
not locally limited 
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it is not present and see whether there is a systematic relationship 
between factor A's presence or absence and result B, even though 
other things are also changing. In fact, at present there are well-
established statistical procedures for identifying a significant rela-
tionship if one exists, provided enough cases are examined. 
Because the range of factors which might explain any given re-
sult in the real world is so broad, a large number of independent 
observations is required to determine whether a particular factor 
is influencing a given result. A pattern of correlation takes on in-
creasing significance if it is encountered over and over again de-
spite the fact that other factors are varying in an uncontrolled way. 
Thus, the fact that a man is shorter than his wife does not establish 
that men are shorter than women or that short men choose tall 
wives. However, if a representative sample of ten thousand men 
and women shows that the men are, on the average, several inches 
taller than women, we are justified in concluding that this pattern 
is a significant one and that men do indeed tower over women. 
(The matrimonial question would require a different set of data.) 
Ideally, a lawyer trying to impress a court might have wished 
to study all loans made in the country. Since this was impossible-
as well as unnecessary from the statistical point of view-we set-
tled for a sample of transactions. In order for the results obtained 
from any such sample to permit valid inferences applicable to the 
population of loans we were ultimately interested in, our sample 
would have to be representative of the population. For such pur-
poses a random sample is, paradoxically, ideal. The probability that 
a random sample will be representative can be predicted with sta-
tistical precision, and the probability that sample results closely 
match those which would be obtained if the entire universe were 
studied increases as the sample size increases.12 
With unlimited time and money we could, of course, have set 
out to collect such data ourselves. But it is always convenient and 
often possible to use someone else's statistics which have usually 
been collected for some other purpose. Clients' records, govern-
ment agencies, private organizations, and universities are all prime 
data sources. Fortunately, we discovered that in 1955 the Federal 
Reserve Board had conducted a sweeping survey of the business 
lending activities of a sample of almost 2,000 of its 6,000 member 
banks. This survey of over 180,000 separate loan transactions se-
12. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the intricacies of survey 
design and sampling techniques. But these are well-established and thoroughly ac-
cepted by statisticians. 
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lected on a statistical sampling basis accurately reflected the char-
acteristics of more than 1,185,000 business loans totalling more than 
$30 billion. In addition to the location of both borrower and bank, 
the Federal Reserve study contained information about a variety of 
characteristics of bank, customer, and loan-many of which seemed 
likely to be relevant to our inquiry.13 
13. The consent of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was 
necessary before we were able to obtain the data from the 1955 survey. To obtain 
this consent, we made contact with the key economists at the Research Department 
of the Federal Reserve Board to discuss the possibility of using the 1955 business loan 
survey data. It was relatively easy to convince these economists that our proposal was 
based on a carefully conceived, feasible research program which would yield results 
of general interest to the Board and the banking and academic communities. This was 
helped by a preliminary analysis of the work already done by the Federal Reserve 
Board, which showed some significant correlations and suggested the need for further 
work along the lines we proposed. 
There was, however, one stumbling block which is likely to arise in many attempts 
to use data sources developed by other organizations for their own use. The 1955 
business loan survey, though already coded in machine-readable form, contained de-
tailed information permitting the identification of individual banks as well as bank 
customers. For the Federal Reserve Board to reveal such information would have 
violated the confidential basis on which it was collected from the banks. Our ability 
to use the data depended upon our ability to use the data without requiring such 
disclosure. 
Since this problem is likely to arise often, a few words about our solution of it are 
in order. One expedient involved the suppression of data that identified the lending 
bank. Instead of identifying each bank by a code number and by its location and size, 
as the original data did, we reclassified the data to have a new bank identification 
number assigned that referred to three (or more) banks of the same general size in 
the same location. In a few cases it was necessary to have banks from different local· 
ities in the same group. Where this was necessary, an attempt was made to choose 
similar localities to group together. Each loan transaction was kept separate in other 
respects; a computer print-out would show only that one of these banks had made a 
certain loan, but not which one. The use of small groups to avoid disclosure without 
at the same time losing all of the information about individual entitites has been used 
in other connections-for example, in analyzing confidential data reported by tele• 
vision broadcasting stations to the Federal Communications Commission. If there is 
to be no identification it is necessary that each group contain a minimum of three re-
porting entities; in this way even one of the three grouped banks cannot identify the 
data for one of the other banks with which it is grouped. 
A second expedient was to replace precisely coded values of variables by quantita• 
tive intervals. For example, all borrowers with total assets of $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 
would be coded as of the same size class. 
Care must be taken in reclassifying data for the purpose of avoiding disclosure not 
to throw away information that might be important. When a group of banks (as in 
this case) is created, any differences among the banks in any one group disappear and 
cannot be focused upon for their explanatory value in the analysis that follows. Thus, 
any potentially relevant variables must be preserved, particularly in an adversary 
proceeding. Our grouping of banks assumed that bank size and bank location were 
relevant. If on the other hand we had supposed that the age of bank was important, 
a different set of groupings would have been in order. Although it ultimately devel-
oped that bank size was not an important variable for our purposes, we could not 
have assumed this nor would we have been unchallenged had we assumed it. 
By grouping banks and adjusting class intervals it was possible to assure the Fed-
eral Reserve Board that we had a reclassification scheme in which no bank or bor-
rower would be identified in any individual transaction. With this assurance the 
Federal Reserve Board gave permission to utilize the data. A computer program was 
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No secondhand data are ever wholly satisfactory, and this set 
was no exception. Five principal deficiencies became apparent: 
I. The data were for 1955, six years before the merger date. 
This was potentially a serious weakness, but the basic patterns of 
bank and customer behavior we were looking for would not be 
likely to change rapidly.14 Research disclosed that the 1955 survey 
was the only suitable source of data for our purposes.15 
2. The data, although a random sample of loans of banks in the 
Federal Reserve System, did not sample the 50 per cent of the na-
tion's banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 
Comparable data for nonmember banks was not generally available, 
although (fortunately) we were able to find such data for the Chi-
cago metropolitan area in the final stages of the study.16 
3. The data referred only to business loans. This meant that 
we would have to focus on the business-lending aspect of the bank-
ing business, but that was, after all, a most important aspect. In 
the Philadelphia Bank case the Antitrust Division relied heavily on 
testimony about the supposed plight of the small businessman, and 
the Supreme Court reflected this concern in its opinion.17 
4. The data did not consider business loans of nonbank finan-
cial institutions. The economists urged that we supplement these 
data in order to consider the effect of competition from nonbank 
financial institutions in defining markets and computing market 
shares. Plainly, the addition of nonbank competitors might dra-
matically reduce concentration in the market.18 After the decision 
in the Philadelphia Bank case, however, it seemed equally plain to 
the lawyers that the appropriate "line of commerce" in bank merger 
cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act was commercial banking.19 
developed which took the original data, reclassified it, and produced a new computer 
tape containing the essential information about each of the 180,000 loan transactions 
in the 1955 Loan Survey. This tape can not be used to discover confidential infor-
mation about individual banks or borrowers. 
14. Our efforts to update the 1955 data to 1961 are briefly described in note 46 
infra. 
15. The Federal Reserve Board had conducted a similar wide-ranging study of 
business loans in 1957. However, this study omitted the critical variable of borrower 
location and it was therefore of no value to us. 
16. See note 42 infra. 
17, 374 U.S. at 369. 
18. Refer to the equation contained in note 9 supra. Nonbank custom would in-
crease the denominator of the ratio without changing the numerator. It would thus 
necessarily reduce the market shares of banks. By way of contrast, our proposal was 
to compute concentration ratios based on the elimination of "wholesale" business. 
This would affect both the denominator and numerator of the ratio and need not 
necessarily reduce concentration. 
19. This question has perhaps been reopened by the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 
80 Stat. 7. 
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The lawyers therefore rejected this academic advice, at least for the 
purposes of this litigation. 
5. The basis of sampling was the individual loan, not the in-
dividual borrower. This seemingly minor point became very im-
portant at a later stage in our analysis.20 
Had this body of data not been available, our subsequent re-
search would have been different but we should still have been able 
to splice together other smaller bodies of data and make some prog-
ress toward defining the relevant market. 
VI. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES 
With the data available we set about our research for an ex-
planation of the differences between local and nonlocal loans. In 
quantitative analysis the search for objective explanations begins 
with the identification of systematically related variables. If two vari-
ables tend to be systematically related, as are the height and weight 
of individuals, they are said to be "correlated." The degree of cor-
relation may vary from very low to very high. At one extreme, "zero 
correlation" means that there is no systematic tendency for a rela-
tionship between the variables. At the other extreme, "perfect cor-
relation" implies that all of the variation in one variable can be 
accounted for by variation in the other. 21 
Our first objective was to determine whether we could account 
for a substantial part of the difference between local and nonlocal 
loans on the basis of systematic correlation with other measurable 
variables. The 1955 business loan survey made this possible because 
every loan covered by the survey was identifiable as either a local 
or a nonlocal loan; it was clear if the borrower and the bank were 
located in the same place or in two different places.22 The survey 
also contained information about some twenty-five additional char-
20. See pages 1666-68 infra. 
21. See note 26 infra. 
22. In the 1955 survey a loan was considered local if the borrower's address was 
in the same city, county or metropolitan area (whichever was the largest) as that of 
the bank. For example, a loan made by a bank in Chicago to a customer located 
anywhere in the Chicago metropolitan area, including the suburbs, was treated as a 
local loan. ·we established, as a separate exercise in quantitative analysis, that this 
area was indeed the proper local "retail" market area by an analysis of the geographic 
distribution of the retail business of the Continental and City National Banks, and 
also by special surveys of seven other smaller banks in the area, selected in a random 
manner. The analysis showed that the area served by a bank did not always cover the 
entire metropolitan area, but the coverage increased as the size of the bank increased. 
There was so much overlapping of areas served, however, that it was clear that only 
the metropolitan area as a whole was a satisfactory market definition, rather than some 
smaller area, as the government contended. 
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acteristics of each such loan transaction.28 On the basis of our con-
versations with bankers, the testimony in previous cases, economic 
theory, and common sense, we expected to find that some of these 
characteristics, such as loan size, borrower size, and bank size, would 
help account for the difference between local and nonlocal loans. 
Well-established statistical techniques permit the determination 
of whether and to what extent each of a series of "independent vari-
ables"-in our case factors such as loan size, borrower size, and bank 
size-helps account for the variation in the "dependent variable"-
in our case whether the loan was local or nonlocal. The phrase "sig-
nificantly correlated" means that a systematic relationship is strong 
enough to make it highly improbable that it reflects mere chance. 
One way to suggest the approach is to look at a simple one-way 
tabulation of the data. Table I shows the relation between size of 
loan and the location characteristic.24 This table summarizes infor-
mation covering all of the loans in the 1955 survey, over 180,000 
sampled transactions representative of over one million loans. Table 
I clearly shows that, ignoring all other factors, the percentage of 
loans made locally decreases as the size of loan increases. Although 
any particular loan might be local or nonlocal for a large number 
of reasons, the pattern which emerges from this table suggests that 
one of the important reasons has something to do with the loan size. 
A similar finding emerged for borrower size, as shown in table 2. 
Ignoring all other factors, the tendency to borrow nonlocally in-
creases as the size of the borrower increases. 
On the other hand, not all of the factors we had chosen ex-
hibited such a clear relationship. As table 3 shows, for example, 
increasing bank size is not associated with any clear pattern in the 
location characteristic of the loans. 
From these three tables we are not entitled to conclude that 
23. A partial listing of these characteristics is as follows: 
Bank characteristics: Federal Reserve district, state, city of the lending bank; (from 
these we also can derive branching status, and city size); size of bank (total deposits); 
loan ratio. 
Borrower characteristics: Legal form of organization, date of organization, business 
of borrower; city location of borrower; location relative to lending bank; size of bor-
rower (total assets). 
Loan characteristics: Original amount of loan; amount outstanding; original ma-
turity of loan; bank participation; call class of loan; repayment method; type of col-
lateral; effective interest rate; date loan made; federal government participation or 
guarantee. 
24. In our analysis we actually looked both at number of loans and dollar balance 
of loans. In this exposition we will limit attention to number of loans. This is partly 
a matter of convenience, but more basically since the loan survey was a sample of 
loans, it is each loan that is an independent observation, not each dollar. In general, 
the result5 were similar whether number of loans or dollar amount was used. 
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SI million-5 million 
$5 million-IO million 
$10 million and over 
All Loan Sizes 
a. Here and elsewhere, lower limit inclusive. 
TABLE 2 






$1 million-5 million 
$5 million-25 million 
$25 million-100 million 
$100 million and over 
All Borrower Sizes 
TABLE 3 
Bank Size and Loan Location 
Bank Size 
(Total deposits) 
Under $50 million 
$50 million-200 million 
$200 million-400 million 
$400 million-1.5 billion 
$1.5 billion and over 
All Bank Sizes 
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loan size and borrower size are important but that bank size is not. 
It does not suffice to examine separately each of a series of possible 
independent variables in relation to the dependent variable, loca-
tion of the loan transaction. It is entirely possible that two separate 
characteristics, each of which appears to relate systematically to dif-
ferences in the location characteristic, are really measuring the same 
thing. Everyone knows that borrowers of large amounts tend to be 
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larger firms; indeed, a large loan creates a large asset. The apparent 
relationships in tables 1 and 2 may really be due to only one of 
these characteristics; there is no way to tell which from those tables. 
One way to sort out these relationships is to cross-classify by both 
variables, as is done in table 4. In this table every row examines the 
variation according to borrower size for a given size of loan. A row 
partakes of the "controlled experiment" in which we examine the 
effect upon the location characteristic of variation in customer size 
holding loan size constant. Each column holds customer size con-
stant and looks at the effect of loan size. Since each row of table 4 
shows a systematic relation between customer size and the location 
characteristic, we can conclude that customer size plays a role inde-
pendent of loan size. And, since each column shows a systematic 
relation between loan size and the location characteristic, we con-
clude that loan size also plays a role independent of customer size. 
We have made progress, but we are not ready to conclude that 
both loan size and customer size are important explanatory vari-
ables. The reason is that table 4 ignored a variety of other variables. 
For example, in that table we included all loans--some were single 
bank loans, some pool loans, some secured, some unsecured, some 
at higher interest rate than others, and so forth. Perhaps the appar-
ent pattern of table 4 is due to differences in these respects; the 
apparent relationship between loan and customer size may be a 
spurious one reflecting other "real differences" that just happen to 
be correlated with loan and customer size. Apparent relationships 
often disappear when considered with other factors. 
These first tentative steps into the mystery of quantitative multi-
variate analysis have taken us to the very heart of the experimental 
process we are describing. Since it is impossible to control variables 
in a social or economic context as a physical scientist does in a 
physics or chemistry experiment, it is necessary to introduce such 
controls by studying a large number of actual events in all of their 
complexity. This would be impossible without the techniques of 
modern statistics and the mechanical assistance of the computer. 
With the computer, it is simply a matter of gathering the data, 
designing the computer program to process the data, and feeding 
it all into the computer. Out pops the result: an acre of tables or 
mathematical formulae. (Patience: you are paying your experts to 
teach you how to reduce the tables to reasoned verbal arguments.) 
In principle, the computer is used to classify the basic infor-
mation so that the interrelationships between the various indepen-
Under 
Loan Size $50,000 






$500,000-1 million 25.0 
$1 million-5 million " 
$5 million-IO million -
$10 million and over -
All loan sizes 90.5 
• Six or fewer loans in cell. 
.. Includes borrowers of unknown size. 
- No loans in cell. 
TABLE 4 
Loan Size, Borrower Size, and Loan Location 
(Percentage of Loans Made Locally) 
Borrower Size (Total Assets) 
$50,000- $250,000- $1 million- $5 million- $25 million-
250,000 1 million 5 million 25 million 100 million 
91.6% 86.3% 82.7% 71.5% 74.4% 
90.7 87.2 73.3 59.9 50.7 
89.7 88.0 76.4 59.4 24.7 
87.7 86.5 75.9 48.2 41.l 
89.2 84.5 72.7 52.9 27.0 
81.3 81.2 71.4 52.3 38.2 
57.5 74.5 71.2 60.3 35.7 
59.3 43.4 62.4 56.5 40.l 
- • • 48.6 37.3 
- - - 40.9 29.6 
91.2 86.6 75.0 56.1 38.0 
$100 million All borrower 
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dent variables and the dependent variables are fully revealed. There 
are two basic ways to do this. One way is the cross-classification: a 
table or a series of tables in which each variable under study is 
introduced and related to each other variable. Table 4 is an ex-
ample of a two-way cross-classification. In preparing a cross-classifica-
tion, the computer pigeonholes each transaction in an appropriate 
"cell" described by the particular values of each of the variables 
under consideration. It then prints out each cell in a prespecified 
pattern, adding up and perhaps performing calculations upon the 
observations in each cell. Thus, in table 4, the upper left hand cell 
represents loans of under $10,000 to borrowers with assets of less 
than $50,000. The computer has stuffed the cell with all such loans 
and then computed the percentage of such loans which were made 
to local customers. The result is 90.6 per cent. 
The only technological limit to cross-classification is the memory 
capacity of the computer. There is, however, a limit to the process, 
even for the expert, because the addition of every new variable mul-
tiplies the number of cells by the number of possible values of the 
new variable. A simple example will make this clear. Suppose we 
visualize nine categories of loan size, nine of customer size, five of 
bank size, and ten categories of type of loan. There are 81 (9 X 9) 
distinct combinations of loan size and customer size. Each of these 
eighty-one cells can contain loans by each of five bank sizes; thus 
there are 405 distinct loan-customer-bank size classes. But each of 
these cells can contain ten different types of loan. To distinguish 
among them while still maintaining all of the previous distinctions 
requires 4,050 distinct cells. It would take a very large body of ex-
perimental data to "fill" a cross-classification with 4,050 cells to 
such an extent that significant patterns would be apparent. The 
great virtue of the Federal Reserve Board's 1955 business loan sur-
vey was in its 180,000 sampled transactions which represented over 
one million loans; the large number of observations permitted ex-
tensive cross-classification. In this respect, our most serious restraint 
was the inability of the mind to interpret what spewed out of the 
computer. Our largest cross-classification contained over 200 pages 
of computer printout; each page contained ninety-nine cells; six 
independent variables were cross-classified. 
The 1955 business loan survey contained over twenty-five vari-
ables of potential interest to us. No single cross-classification could 
realistically examine this number of variables.25 Fortunately, the 
25. Consider the approximate number of cells. Suppose each variable had only 5 
values. This means 525 cells-an astronomical number of the order of a billion billion. 
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social scientist, aided and abetted by the mathematical stat1st1c1an, 
has other tools for dealing with problems of this complexity. The 
most important is regression analysis, which examines simulta-
neously a large number of independent variables using computer-
assisted mathematical techniques. Given a properly constituted body 
of observations, regression analysis can give estimates of the effect 
of changes in each independent variable on changes in the depen-
dent variable, holding all other independent variables constant. It 
can also reveal the likelihood that these observed relationships in 
the data are the result of chance or reflect actual relationships in the 
universe from which the data was collected. Furthermore, regression 
analysis will show how much of the variation in the dependent vari-
able is accounted for by variations in the independent variables 
studied or, conversely, how much of the variation in the dependent 
variable is the result of chance, measurement errors, or the influ-
ence of other variables not included in the analysis. Here we enter 
an area which borders on the occult.26 Suffice it to say that, in the 
Even our enormous sample of 180,000 loans would appear as flecks of dust in a moun-
tain of zeros in any cross-classification containing so many cells. 
26. We cannot give the uninitiated a short course in statistics here. But we can at 
least illuminate the vocabulary by a somewhat oversimplified illustration. The fol-
lowing are the hypothetical results of a regression analysis in which an attempt was 
made to relate variation in a dependent variable {Y) to three independent variables 
<X1, X:J, Xs): 
Hypothesized Relationship: 
Relationship to be estimated: 
Computed Relationship: 
Coefficient of Determination: 
Y=a1 X1 +¾ X2 +a3 X3 +e 
Y'=a1 X1 +a2 X2 +a3 X3 
y, = .20)S_ + .04X2 -.13X3 
~=-61 
Significance of Regression Coefficients 
Significantly 
Standard different from 
Coefficient error t ratio zero at 5% level 
.20 
¾ .05 --= 4.0 yes .05 
.04 
a2 .002 -=20.0 yes 
.002 
.13 
1.4 aa .09 --= no 
.09 
The measures a1, a2 and a3 are called regression coefficients; they are estimates of 
al' ¾ and a 3• Each regression coefficient tells how much the dependent variable {Y) 
changes on average for each unit change in the particular independent variable, 
holding the other independent variables constant. For example, the fact that a1 = 
+.20 means that for a IO unit increase in the value of Xl' it is predicted that Y will 
increase by 2 units on the average, assuming no change in X2 or X3• 
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Continental Bank case, the consulting economists used regression 
analysis to examine a large number of variables and to eliminate 
a number of variables which were found to be unimportant.27 
In the Continental Bank case we deliberately chose cross-classi-
fication instead of regression as the primary technique of multi-
variate analysis for two reasons. First, the lawyers were convinced 
that a courtroom presentation based on a regression analysis would 
strain the limits of judicial tolerance. Second, in some areas, cross-
classifications were more revealing of significant relationships than 
was regression analysis.28 But cross-classification was used only on the 
variables that regression analysis suggested might prove significant. 
The absolute size of the regression coefficients is not necessarily an indication of 
their importance, for two reasons. The first is that the importance of a coefficient 
depends on the units in which the X's and Y are measured as well as the range of 
their variation. For example, using the hypothetical formula given above, suppose 
that X1 can vary only from O to 2, that X2 can vary from 100 to 1000, and that Y is 
normally a number with a value like 50. The predicted variation in Y resulting from 
the maximum variation in X1 would be .4 (2 X .2 = .4). This is a relatively unim-
portant variation where Y is normally in the range of 50. On the other hand, a maxi-
mum variation in X., would be 900 and the predicted effect on Y from such a 
variation would be ll6 (900 X .04 = ll6). This is a relatively important variation. 
The second reason that the absolute size of the regression coefficient does not indi-
cate their importance is that these figures are averages. Their reliability depends on 
how much variation there is around the average, looking at the individual cases. The 
standard error of the regression coefficient gives a measure of that variability. Roughly 
two-thirds of the individual observations will lie within ± one standard error of the 
mean of a normally distributed variable and 95% will lie within ± two standard 
errors. For example, the value of a1 (.20) is more than twice its standard error (.05). 
Hence there is less than a 5% chance that the true value of the coefficient (X1) is 
equal to zero, and the value of a1 is the result of sampling variation. Using this widely 
accepted 5% test in our example, both a1 and a2 are "significantly" different from 
zero in the sense that it is highly improbable that they reflect sampling variation from 
an a1 or ¾ equal to zero. On the other hand, a3 has a value less than twice its stan-
dard error and there is more than a 5% chance that it comes from an a
3 
= 0. 
Finally, the coefficient of determination R2 shows how much of the variation in 
Y is accounted for by the estimated relationship with X1, X2 and X3• In our example 
61 % is accounted for. The "unexplained" ll9% is presumably due to chance, to errors 
in measurement, and most important to the potentially enormous list of other vari-
ables that also influence Y. All of these are embodied in the e ("epsilon" or "error') 
term in the hypothesized relationship. 
27. For example, interest rate was eliminated as an important variable. Although 
the regression coefficient of the interest rate variable was significantly different from 
zero, even if this variable could vary over its complete range, holding other variables 
constant, its estimated effect would only account for a change of 2% in the proportion 
of loans that are nonlocal. The potential contribution of the interest rate is even 
less than this because of its high degree of correlation with loan and borrower sizes 
and other variables. For given values of the other variables its variation would be 
restricted and its independent variation would account for a considerably smaller 
change in the proportion of nonlocal loans. 
28. This was true, for example, of the effect of secured as contrasted with non-
secured loans, where the effect was limited to one type of loan, See note 32 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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The relatively small list of six variables of demonstrated sig-
nificance in explaining variation in the location characteristic of 
the loan produced the 200-page cross-classification mentioned above. 
It was designed to reveal the nature of the relationships in a way 
that was amenable to understanding by the lawyers and to presen-
tation to a court. These six important variables were loan size, 
borrower size, participation status of the loan, secured status of the 
loan, size of the borrower's city, and the nature of the branch bank-
ing laws in the borrower's state. 
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES 
The identification of "significant" variables is a matter of apply-
ing well-known and professionally accepted statistical techniques. 
This aspect of the total experimental process is dependent upon 
sophisticated mathematical analysis as well as upon the use of com-
puters. Although the lawyer is likely to be left far behind the ex-
perts in this area, his expertise and understanding of the realities 
of the case are essential when it comes to the interpretation of the 
significant characteristics. 
Thus far, our study had revealed only the significant differences 
between local and nonlocal loans. Our real interest lay in the iden-
tification of locally limited as opposed to non-locally limited loans. 
The local loan category included some wholesale customers who 
could have borrowed nonlocally had they wished. We needed to 
distinguish between variables causally related to the necessity of 
borrowing locally and variables that reflected mere convenience in 
banking locally. Since we wished ultimately to develop a standard 
of local limitation for application to the Chicago metropolitan area, 
we were interested only in factors that could be operative there in 
identifying wholesale and retail bank customers. With these goals 
in mind, we settled to the task of deciding why the significant vari-
ables were significant.29 
A. Loan Size 
As table I indicates, the percentage of loans made locally shows 
a clear and steady decline as the size of loan increases. Nonlocal 
loans, in other words, tend typically to be larger than local loans. 
It is not hard to find causal factors that link loan size to local lim-
29. All of the following statements about the "facts" are based upon the full multi-
variate analysis. They are, in other words, the net of the effect of the other variables in-
cluded in the analysis. 
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itation. The larger the loan, the more attractive it becomes to 
bankers. Moreover, a large loan justifies the bank expenditures re-
quired to establish the credit position of the borrower. Widely dis-
persed banks are willing and able to consider such loans and to 
make a good fraction of them. Conversely, the small borrower often 
finds that the costs of getting information about himself to banks 
in areas where he is not known makes such banks either totally 
unwilling to deal with him or willing to do so only at prohibitive 
interest rates. Loan size, we concluded, was a measure of ability 
to borrow nonlocally. 
B. Borrower Size 
Table 2 demonstrates that the percentage of loans made non-
locally shows a marked tendency to increase as borrower size in-
creases. The distinction is particularly pronounced between bor-
rowers with assets over and under $1 million. Again, causal links 
with ability to borrow nonlocally are easy to find. Large companies 
tend to have well-established national credit ratings, widely dis-
persed business activities, standing contacts with banks in many 
parts of the country, and a need for a large variety of banking ser-
vices (including large deposit accounts and corporate trust depart-
ment services). All of these factors make the large borrower an 
attractive customer for many banks. We concluded that borrower 
size was a significant indicator of whether or not a loan was locally 
limited. As noted above,80 these two factors have independent sig-
nificance; table 4 shows that an increase in the size of the loan or 
in the size of the borrower results in an increase in the proportion 
of nonlocal loans, even though the other factor is held constant. In 
other words, large loans to small borrowers and small loans to large 
borrowers both tend to show a greater proportion of nonlocal loans 
than small loans to small borrowers. 
C. Participation Status of Loan 
This variable distinguishes between types of loans on the basis 
of the number of banks involved: single-bank loans; "overline par-
ticipation loans," in which one bank-the "originating bank"-
shares with another bank a loan which the originating bank does 
not wish (or is not legally permitted) to make alone; and "pool 
loans," in which the customer negotiates with a group of two or 
more banks to meet its borrowing requirements. The statistical 
30. See page 1655 supra. 
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analysis showed that almost 90 per cent of all single-bank loans 
were local in character, while only 45 per cent of all pool loans 
were local. Overline loans, like single-bank loans, were predomi-
nantly local when viewed as loans of the originating bank (85 per 
cent local), but for the nonoriginating bank were even less localized 
than pool loans (only 37 per cent local). 
A pool loan by definition is one in which a borrower chooses to 
deal with a group of two or more banks. A borrower with sufficient 
sophistication to undertake this sort of arrangement will tend to 
exploit the competitive advantages of negotiating with a large num-
ber of banks, some of which are likely to be outside of his local 
area; hence the large proportion of nonlocal pool loans. We were 
prepared to regard the difference between pool loans and single 
bank loans as reflective of ability to borrow nonlocally.81 
Overline loans presented a different problem. Ordinarily, in an 
overline loan only the originating bank deals with the borrower; 
the other bank participates in the loan at the request of the orig-
inating bank. The borrower may not even be aware that the second 
bank is involved. The economists initially suggested that overline 
loans be divided into two groups; those loans made by the orig-
inating bank would be lumped with single bank loans, those loans 
made by the nonoriginating bank would be considered with pool 
loans. On the basis of the statistical findings, this classification seemed 
reasonable since the two types of overline loans appeared to share 
the statistical characteristics of the single bank and pool loans, re-
spectively. Upon consideration of the banking realities of the situa-
tion, however, we realized that this solution was erroneous. Since 
our analysis was focusing on the borrower's behavior in relation to 
his bank or banks, it was irrelevant that banks chose to place over-
lines with nonlocal banks. Thus, the low level of local loans in the 
category "overlines originating at another bank" revealed nothing 
about customer-bank relationships. The customer's ability to deal 
with banks in various localities could be measured only by looking 
at the bank with which he dealt-the originating bank. Hence, for 
the purpose of identifying local limitation, only the experience of 
the originating bank was significant. 
D. Secured Status 
In this case our hunches were not confirmed by the figures. We 
had been reasonably sure before the data were processed that 
31. Again this effect is in addition to the effect of other variables such as loan size 
or borrower size. 
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whether or not a loan was secured would prove to be significant. We 
suspected that secured loans would tend to be less local than unse~ 
cured loans because collateral would make a borrower more attrac~ 
tive to distant lenders. We were quite wrong. There was a significant 
relationship, but it was complex. For overline participation and pool 
loans, the existence of collateral had no significant effect. For single-
bank loans, the cross-classification showed that both where the bor-
rower was small (assets under $1 million) and where the loan was 
small (under $25,000) secured loans were significantly more local 
than unsecured loans. A partial explanation of this finding may be 
that if a relatively small business borrower needs collateral to obtain 
a loan, this suggests a weakness in his credit rating which frightens 
off nonlocal banks. If this is so, "secured status" is serving as a proxy 
for a variable not included in the analysis: "credit rating." Assuming 
that this was the case, we concluded that in the case of single-bank 
loans the presence or absence of collateral would have to be taken 
into account in determining local limitation.82 
E. Size of Borrower's City 
Table 5 reveals that, in addition to the other significant variables, 
the larger the borrower's city, the smaller the percentage of loans 
TABLE 5 
Size of the Borrower's City and Loan Location 
Size of Borrower's City 
(population) 
Cities of 8 million and over 
Cities of 2 million to 8 million 
Cities of less than 2 million 
Unclassified Cities and other areas 
All City Sizes 







made nonlocally. All other things being equal, a borrower in New 
York is more likely to borrow at home than a borrower in Philadel-
phia or Kalamazoo. At first glance this may seem surprising; one 
might expect the New York borrower to be more sophisticated finan-
cially, and one would hardly expect his credit with nonlocal banks 
to be adversely affected by the size of his city. 
32. Use of a variable for only part of the data may sound peculiar, but it is not. 
Perhaps an illustration from far afield will help to clarify the problem. Studies of 
labor force participation show that age and sex are highly important variables in 
explaining whether or not a person is in the labor force. The number and age of the 
individual's children is very important for women, but of no importance for men, 
for obvious reasons. A careful analysis of the problem will include this variable fot 
women, but not for men. 
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In fact, we concluded that this factor does not reflect inability 
to borrow nonlocally, but rather indicates less need to do so. We 
reasoned that non-locally limited customers would borrow locally 
only if local banks had adequate resources. Accordingly, other things 
being equal, borrowers in large cities would be more likely than 
those in small cities to deal with local banks simply because the 
banking resources of a large city are greater than those of a smaller 
city. In interpreting the data in order to identify ability to borrow 
nonlocally, the city-size relationship complicates rather than sim-
plifies. It emphasizes that some local loans are indeed made to non-
locally limited borrowers. This factor had to be accommodated in 
our subsequent analysis. 
F. Branch Banking Situation at Borrower's Location 
Borrowers in states where the banking laws permit operation of 
branch banks tend to secure a significantly larger percentage of 
their loans within their local area than do borrowers in unit-banking 
jurisdictions which permit a bank to have only one business office.33 
The explanation of this finding also appears to reflect available 
banking resources and not local limitation. In general, the resources 
of the banking system are more widely available to borrowers in 
branch banking states than in unit-banking states. The widespread 
branches of a large bank can readily draw on the resources of the 
home office. The Bank of America-although headquartered in San 
Francisco-is in the same community as the borrower in Sacramento; 
but the First National Bank of Chicago is a nonlocal bank to the 
borrower in Peoria. 
G. Summary 
We concluded that four of the six independent variables signifi-
cantly related to loan location would be directly useful in developing 
a standard of local limitation: loan size, borrower size, participation 
status of loan, and secured status of loan. We felt that the remaining 
two variables, borrower's city size and borrower location in a branch-
33. The one-variable classification on the basis of branch as compared to unit-
banking stateiJ (similar to tables 1, 2, 3 and 5) showed only a small difference in the 
percentage of local loans when number of loans was taken as a measure (customers in 
branch banking states: 89.9% local loans; customers in unit-banking states: 85.4% 
local loans). The difference was more marked when dollar amounts rather than num-
ber of loans was considered (branching: 69.5%; unit: 51.9%), Furthermore, this pat-
tern persisted through the multivariate tables, justifying its inclusion as a significant 
variable. 
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or unit-banking state, did not reflect the ability of a borrower to 
borrow outside his own locality but rather indicated his need to do 
so. 
VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF LOCAL LIMITATION 
The problem remaining was to distinguish between the local 
"retail" customer and the local "wholesale" customer who presum-
ably could borrow nonlocally. The economists suggested that those 
local borrowers who shared the distinguishing characteristics of the 
nonlocal borrower be classified as non-locally limited. For example, 
since nonlocal loans tended to predominate among very large loans, 
we would treat very large local loans as not locally limited. Since 
nonlocal loans tended to predominate among loans to very large bor-
rowers, we would treat local loans to very large borrowers as not 
locally limited. We would attempt to define and adopt a quantitative 
standard for drawing a line between locally limited and non-locally 
limited customers based upon the constellation of characteristics 
that were associated with those borrowers who had demonstrated by 
their actual loan behavior that they were not locally limited. 
The economists designed the second stage of the analysis to build 
upon the foundations laid by the first. The prior steps had included 
all of the loans in the 1955 loan survey in order to have the widest 
possible range of data from which to determine the basic patterns. 
For the second stage, we restricted the sample to loans made to bor-
rowers in unit-banking states, since we had concluded that the loan 
location characteristic with respect to borrowers in branch banking 
states was influenced by the reduced need of such borrowers to look 
elsewhere for loans and since the Continental Bank case required 
us to define the locally limited market in Illinois, a unit-banking 
state. On the other hand, it was impossible to make a similar allow-
ance for the effect of the size of the borrower's city without unduly 
restricting the body of experimental data; Chicago was alone in its 
population size class (two to eight million) in unit-banking states. 
The next step was to divide the loans to borrowers in unit-bank-
ing states into five categories corresponding to their participation 
and secured status. Separate consideration was to be given to (1) 
single-bank secured loans, (2) single-bank unsecured loans, (3) over-
line loans (originating bank), (4) overline loans (nonoriginating 
bank), and (5) pool loans. For each of these five types of loan we set 
up a table classifying transactions by loan size and borrower size. 
Each such table constitutes a part of the cross-classification on the 
four variables (loan size, borrower size, participation status, secured 
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status) we had identified as both relevant for distinguishing local 
from nonlocal loans and reflective of ability to borrow nonlocally. 
One of these five tables is table 6. Each cell in table 6 contains 
information about single-bank unsecured loans of a specified size 
to borrowers of a specified size. The number in the cell shows the 
percentage of all such loans which were made to local borrowers. 
As expected, this table shows in almost every row and column a 
decreasing proportion of local loans as loan size and borrower size 
increase.34 In general, local loans predominate in the upper left 
hand part of the table and nonlocal loans predominate in the lower 
right hand part. Our problem was to find a boundary-running 
approximately from lower left to upper right-that divided the 
table into locally limited and non-locally limited characteristics. 
In deciding where to draw this boundary line, we began with 
the proposition that the higher the percentage of nonlocal loans in 
any cell, the greater the likelihood that other borrowers of the same 
size borrowing the same amount would be able to borrow nonlocally. 
The question then was how large a percentage of loans in a speci-
fic cell must be made nonlocally to permit the inference that all 
other loans with the same characteristics might also have been made 
nonlocally. Nothing in our statistics to this point answered this 
question. Clearly, as long as any wholesale customers chose to deal 
with local banks in whole or in part, some non-locally limited loans 
would be local loans. 
After further consideration, we were led to an estimated boun-
dary figure of 25 per cent nonlocal loans as the level which would 
entitle us to classify all loans in a cell as non-locally limited loans. 
Looking at table 6, this means that cells with a local loan percentage 
of 75 per cent or more were considered as locally limited. In our 
selection of this standard, great emphasis was given to two considera-
tions which may cause non-locally limited loans to appear as local 
loans in the table. The first of these factors we have met before: 
many borrowers who are not locally limited will conduct much of 
their borrowing activity locally simply because loan banks have suf-
ficient resources for the borrowers' needs and offer loans on com-
petitive terms. This is particularly true of large city borrowers, who 
are included in this table and play an important part in the over-all 
sample. The second consideration arises from the fact that the data 
34. The patterns are not as completely systematic as those shown in table 4 be-
cause, as a result of breaking down the data into such detail, the number of trans• 
actions reflected in many cells is relatively small, and hence the fluctuations due to 
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in the 1955 business loan survey concern individual loan transac-
tions, not individual customers. The significance of this is easily 
demonstrated. Suppose one borrower had three outstanding loans of 
equal size, two from banks in his own city and one from a distant 
bank. He has demonstrated by his behavior that he is not locally 
limited. But in the survey his activities would be recorded as three 
separate loans, all in the same cell, with a "local percentage" of 67, 
even though he is demonstrably able to borrow nonlocally. 
There is yet another consideration which suggests that the 25 
per cent nonlocal loan standard was a reasonable and conservative 
one. The 1955 survey showed that only 11 per cent of all loans were 
made nonlocally. The standard we had adopted, therefore, required 
an incidence of nonlocal loans over twice as high as that which 
would be expected in an "average" selection of loans. There was, 
of course, nothing sacred about the 25 per cent standard; we might 
have used 20 per cent or 30 per cent instead.31! But our judgment, 
based on the banking data and what we knew about banking prac-
tices, told us that the correct percentage lay somewhere within that 
range. Subsequently we utilized a completely different set of data 
to validate this approximation. 
With this decision made, drawing the boundary shown by the 
solid line on table 6 was a routine matter.36 A similar boundary was 
drawn on the tabulations for single-bank secured loans, for overline 
loans by originating banks, and for pool loans. Of course, the loca-
tion of the boundary line differed in each case, and the fraction of 
loans classified as locally limited changed because of the effect of 
secured status and loan type on local limitation. Overline loans by 
nonoriginating banks, which were predominately nonlocal in char-
acter, were classified according to the boundary developed for over-
35. For the reader bothered by the use of a standard based on a minority of the 
transactions in a given cell, an example chosen from a quite different area might be 
helpful. Suppose one wanted to estimate the ages at which women usually bear chil-
dren. Suppose further that the available data to answer this question consisted of a 
large sample of women giving the age of each and whether she had a child during the 
previous year. Since in a large group of women only a small percentage have children 
in any year, any age group in which a higher than average number of women had 
children during the year would be an obvious candidate for inclusion in the usual 
child-bearing age group. Yet the second percentage figure might still be far less than 
50%. On the other hand, if the data covered only women who actually bore children 
in a given year, and the ages of these women, an entirely different statistical test would 
be used, based on the distribution of child-bearing ages. Similarly, in our case, the 
base statistic, the percentage of nonlocal loans in the group of all loans, was very low 
and hence the minority of cases which we used in our standard was quite reasonable, 
since the standard was substantially above the average for nonlocal loans. 
36. Largely but not wholly routine because it was necessary to pay attention to the 
number of loans in any cell and the problem of sampling variability where the num-
ber of loans was small. 
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line loans made by originating banks. As discussed above, we had 
concluded that for overline loans the borrower's relationship with 
the originating bank was controlling.37 These tables revealed the 
same general pattern shown in table 6. They defined, tabularly, a 
criterion for classifying loans as locally limited or non-locally limited. 
The line we drew between locally limited and non-locally limited 
loans was to some extent arbitrary, although not capricious. But as 
an arbitrary line it had everything to recommend it over Judge Mac-
Mahon's inspired but unsupported hunch in the Manufacturers Han-
over case.38 Our standard rested on a solid foundation of empirical 
investigation and analysis. Moreover, though our statistical study did 
not determine precisely where the line should be drawn, it did estab-
lish that some line should be drawn. That is, the systematic corre-
lation between the independent variables and the location charac-
teristic were persuasive that there were in fact two different banking 
markets, each with identifiable characteristics. As a result, our stan-
dard of local limitation, far more complex than Judge MacMahon's, 
is also far more difficult for a court to ignore. While no standard 
can be totally objective, it was possible in our procedure to identify 
the specific points in the analysis at which judgment was exercised. 
If a judge once starts down the path marked out by our analysis, he 
can avoid its thrust only by the independent exercise of his judgment 
in drawing the line at some different place. 
IX. VALIDATION OF THE CRITERIA OF LOCAL LIMITATION 
Because judgment did play a role, and because a good lawyer 
does not take unnecessary chances, we sought some independent ways 
to validate the analysis.39 Our principal attempt to validate the pro-
posed standard was by a further study. The value of the 1955 busi-
ness loan survey lay in its extraordinarily wide scope and in the 
fact that it included many important loan characteristics. However, 
it could reveal only where loans were in fact made, not where they 
might have been made. To measure local limitation directly re-
!7. See page 1662 supra. 
!8. See pages 1645-46. 
!9. One such validation was to show that the standard was a very conservative one 
in terms of the number of borrowers classified as non-locally limited. The class of 
locally limited loans according to our standard included 93.8% of all of loans to 
borrowers in unit-banking states; less than 7% were placed in the "wholesale,'' non-
locally limited market. A similar pattern was observed when we looked at the general 
structure of the economy. Using Internal Revenue Service data classifying active 
corporations by asset size, we found that in 1961-1962 only 1.6% had assets of over $5 
million and only 5,7% had asests of over $1 million. In large part, the non-locally 
limited borrowers were in the over $1 million class size. 
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quired more information than the 1955 loan survey could provide. 
However, we could and did study in more detail a random selection 
of a group of customers of the two banks involved in the merger. 
This enabled us to remedy the defect in the 1955 survey, which sur-
veyed loan transactions rather than customers. Looking directly at 
bank customers, we were able to determine the geographic extent of 
the customer's own business operations, his affiliations with larger 
business organizations, and the extent of his banking connections. 
The customer with extensive connections or with dispersed plants 
or offices might be directly classified as not locally limited. On the 
basis of this survey an alternative classification of the customers was 
made. In about 80 per cent of the cases, the results of the two 
classifications were the same, and in the remaining 20 per cent 
the discrepancies went both ways--some customers whom our statis-
tically derived standard had classified as locally limited were classi-
fied as not locally limited by the customer survey; in some cases the 
reverse was true. This was, the lawyers were assured, a good record 
of prediction of individual cases by a technique designed to predict 
aggregate or average behavior.40 
X. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF LOCAL LIMITATION TO THE 
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA BANKING MARKET 
Now we were close to the payoff. The branch of our analysis we 
have described had developed a reasonable and, we believed, wholly 
defensible standard of local limitation. A second major branch had 
attempted to establish that the relevant area of the "retail market" 
was the entire Chicago Metropolitan Area and not any smaller sub-
division thereof. This hypothesis also rested upon a quantitative 
analysis of the location of the Continental Bank's retail customers 
and of the customers served by other banks throughout the area 
40. There are a number of subtle and sophisticated statistical issues involved here 
which we need not go into in this Article. Let us merely mention a few reasons why 
an individual account might be an exception to an average relationship. A customer 
who, statistically, had all the earmarks of a locally limited customer might prove to 
have dispersed banking connections because his father was a well-known tycoon, or be-
cause he had moved recently from another large city. A very large customer who statis-
tically would appear as not locally limited might in fact be limited because the kind 
of business he conducted was specialized in by local banks, or because he had had 
some recent shaky financial experiences that local (but not distant) banks were in a posi-
tion to condone. The vast list of unmeasured influences on human behavior makes 100% 
prediction of individual behavior impossible. but does not prevent accurate prediction 
of group behavior. Life insurance is the classic example. While never venturing to 
predict when an individual will die, insurance companies predict accurately how 
many of a class will die each year. 
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which was based on a stratified random sample of seven banks in the 
area.41 
The final step in analyzing the 1955 loan survey data was to apply 
the standard of local limitation to the Chicago area business loan 
market by computing market shares for Continental and City Na-
tional, as well as for a group of other large banks.42 While we now 
had what the lawyers believed to be the correct concept of the lo-
cally limited market,43 it seemed advantageous for courtroom pre-
sentation to present three different sets of market-share computations 
for 1955. 
First, we wanted a set of market shares based solely on the total 
loans of all Chicago area banks to all of their business customers 
within and without the area. This is the approach to bank market 
shares taken by the Government in attacking bank mergers. It is 
quite simple and thoroughly misleading. 
Market shares based on loans to all Chicago area borrowers by 
all banks within the Chicago area and outside it were also required. 
These computations do not depend on the concept of local limita-
tion; they simply include all borrowers with Chicago area addresses 
in the Chicago market. To move from raw concentration ratios to 
these figures, it is necessary to eliminate loans by Chicago area banks 
to non-Chicago customers and add loans to Chicago customers by 
banks elsewhere. These figures are an improvement over the Govern-
ment's since loans made to customers outside the Chicago area must 
certainly be irrelevant to competition and concentration in the local 
Chicago market. The trouble is that these figures include all the 
loans to those Chicago wholesale customers who could borrow any-
where they wished. 
Finally, we wanted to present a computation of market shares 
and concentration ratios based on loans to customers locally limited 
to the Chicago area. These concentration ratios involve the use of 
the standard of local limitation which our analysis had developed. 
The following tables show the results of the computations. 
41. &e note 22 supra. Our survey covered the loans of a number of smaller banks 
in the Chicago area which were primarily in the retail banking business, as well as the 
two larger banks involved in the merger. On the basis of these surveys, we were 
prepared to argue, therefore, that the entire area was a web of interlocking markets 
with no rational dividing lines smaller than the area as a whole. 
42. We were fortunately able to correct one of the deficiencies in the 1955 survey, 
the absence of data covering loans of banks which were not members of the Federal 
Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago had, in 1955, conducted a 
parallel survey of all banks in the Federal Reserve District, member and nonmember, 
and the bank made these data available to us. 
4S. The economists never wavered in criticizing the lawyers' exclusion of nonbank 
competition. See pages 1651-52 supra. 
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TABLE 7 
Market Shares and Concentration Ratios Based Upon 
Number of Loans-1955 
Continental Bank 
City National Bank 
Continental Bank, After Merger 
Four Largest CMA• Banks 
Four Largest CMA• Banks, After Merger 




























Market Shares and Concentration Ratios Based Upon 
Dollar Volume of Loans-1955 
Continental Bank 
City National Bank 
Continental Bank, After Merger 
Four Largest CMA Banks 
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The reduction in market shares and concentration ratios by 
virtue of what we believe to be proper market definition was dra-
matic; in view of prevailing economic and legal standards, a court 
might well accept it as a difference in kind instead of degree.44 If 
the Government should choose number of loans as the relevant 
measure, market shares (which are in any case relatively low) are cut 
almost in half. If, as was more likely, the Government's focus was 
on dollar volume, the market share of the merged bank would drop 
from 27.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent and the four-bank market share 
would drop from 84.7 per cent to 31.6 per cent.45 Notice, inciden-
44. It is important to note that there is nothing in our procedure which inherently 
reduces market shares and concentration ratios. In any market some banks will have 
more than an average share of locally limited business and some less. Only for the 
former does reduction operate. For example, in table 8, City National Bank's market 
share is increased under our procedure. 
45. The results of our analysis were less favorable to the Continental Bank than 
the application of the $100,000 standard adopted by Judge MacMahon in the Manu• 
facturers-Hanover case. Using the latter standard, Continental's post-merger share of 
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tally, that the simple identification of borrowers' location (as shown 
in the middle columns of tables 7 and 8, which neglect our criteria 
of local limitation) cut dollar volume market shares in half. We had 
every reason to believe that if a similar analysis were possible in 
1961, when the merger took place, an equally impressive reduction 
would have appeared.46 
These large quantitative reductions in concentration ratios have 
a profound qualitative significance. An industry in which the four 
largest firms control more than 80 per cent of the dollar volume of 
business is likely to be dominated by these firms; on the other hand, 
an industry in which the four largest firms control only 30 per cent 
of the dollar volume necessarily has a large number of sellers. In 
the latter situation, rivalry among firms is likely to be intense and 
buyers will have a wide choice of alternatives. 
The utility of our analysis of local limitation did not end with 
the reduction of the merged bank's market share to below 10 per 
cent and the lowering of the four-bank concentration ratio to slightly 
over 30 per cent. The analysis also revealed that the character of 
the local banking market was not at all what surface appearances sug-
gested. 
Using the 1955 figures, for example, Chicago area banks made 
about 23,000 business loans totaling $2.4 billion. The average loan 
balance was over $100,000. While only 3,000 of these loans were to 
borrowers located outside the Chicago area, these nonlocal loans 
accounted for fully one half ($1.2 billion) of the dollar balances. 
Another 1,500 loans by Chicago banks to Chicago-located borrowers 
were excluded from the local market by the application of the stan-
dard of local limitation. The remaining locally limited loans in-
volved only $307 million of loan balances. The average size of these 
locally limited loans was less than $20,000. Thus, although the elim-
ination of non-locally limited loans resulted in only a small reduction 
in the number of loans, it achieved a dramatic reduction in the over-
the number of loans would be 4.2%, of dollar amounts, 7.3%. This loss of advantage 
was more than compensated for, in our view, by the gain in our confidence in the 
ability to defend our standard. 
46. There were a number of techniques we used to justify using the 1955 data 
for a case which arose in 1961. One was the special survey of customers of the merged 
banks, in which we chose 1961 customers as the subject of the study. See note 40 
supra and accompanying text. Another way to show that the structural features of 
banking markets had not changed significantly in the intervening years. Thus, we 
showed that the size distribution of business entities had not significantly altered over 
the period and that the loan portfolios of large banks showed a stable size distribution 
of loans. Each of these demonstrations required special statistical studies on the use 
of existing studies. 
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all dollar volume of the local business loan market and the average 
loan size in that market. 
The significance of this finding can be fully appreciated only in 
the light of the broader economic argument made on behalf of Con-
tinental. The substance of that argument was that the Chicago area 
banking market had been characterized by the entry and successful 
growth of many new banks in the two decades preceding the merger. 
Our finding that the true local-or "retail"-business loan market 
was small in both over-all size and size of individual transactions 
meshed perfectly with the growth of the number of bank competitors 
in the market. If the average local market loan is approximately 
$20,000, it is clear that even the smallest bank could make such 
loans. Therefore, the large downtown banks with their immense 
resources have no preclusive competitive advantages in this local, 
retail market. 
XI. PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS 
Of course, even if all of this reads well in a law review, the im-
portant question is whether courts can be persuaded to accept such 
a statistical analysis. This question in fact breaks down into two 
quite different ones: the question of admissibility and that of in-
telligibility. 
The problem of admissibility need not detain us. La'\'ryers and 
judges in the "big case" have certainly accustomed themselves to 
processing vast quantities of statistical material. Quantitative analy-
sis would not significantly add to this task. Indeed, if the legal 
profession seriously absorbed modern sampling and other statistical 
techniques, the gathering of data for a complicated economic case 
would be simplified. If opposing lawyers can satisfy themselves and 
the court as to the validity of the parties' data selection and pro-
cessing, there should be no difficulty in getting the information re-
vealed by the data into the record. 
The question of intelligibility is a more formidable one. Ob-
viously, if we had presented our 200-page computer printout cross-
classification of the six relevant variables to the court in the Con-
tinental Bank case, we would have done the court and our case a 
disservice. Quantitative analysis is a powerful tool, but we did not 
expect the court to try to trace every step we had taken. 
Indeed, the lawyers' basic courtroom strategy was not to start 
with quantitative analysis at all. We were prepared to produce a 
series of ordinary witnesses, bankers and bank customers, who would 
testify about their own banking experiences. The court would 
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thereby be introduced to the "locally limited" and "non.locally lim-
ited" customer in the flesh. Banks would describe the loans they 
actually made to customers in their locality and to those located else-
where. In this manner we would present "retail" and "wholesale" 
banking in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. 
We planned to hold back our quantitative analysis until the court 
understood our theory of the case and its key terminology. The pre-
sentation of the analysis would then be the task of the economist, 
testifying as an expert witness. We expected him to describe the 
process of data collection and statistical manipulation. This testi-
mony would cover the scope and objectivity of the underlying data, 
as well as the statistical techniques and computer processing we had 
used in preparing the data for analysis. Finally, the economist would 
explain the reasoning process presented in this Article, using our 
tables and charts for illustration and clarification. It would then be 
open to opposing counsel to demonstrate analytic errors and alter-
native explanatory hypotheses. 
XII. A SUMl\fARY AND A PROSPECT 
Our case study has described the essential features of quantita-
tive multivariate analysis as applied to a legal problem. The goal 
of quantitative analysis is to discover and present an ordered analy-
sis of a complex factual situation. It is the counterpart in the social 
sciences of the controlled experiment in the natural sciences. As 
noted above, it is an essential characteristic of quantitative analysis 
that it lays bare the analytic process and does not leave vital ques-
tions to "intuitive" resolution. In this way it should be possible to 
deepen the fact-finding process which is at the heart of every trial. 
The essence of the process is the identification and evaluation 
of the various factors which influence social phenomena. Using quan-
titative analysis, the social scientist can reach insights about which 
factors cause a given result and which do not. To do so, he uses 
data collected from the workings of society as it exists. Although 
no two events are similar in all respects, the social scientist can 
determine significant factors by observing the patterns which emerge 
from a large number of events. For the lawyer, therefore, quantita-
tive analysis will be of use where a question of causation can best 
be answered by indirect evidence. In our case, we developed objec-
tive standards to identify bank borrowers who were locally limited 
by discovering the factors which caused loans to be made locally 
rather than nonlocally. 
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Other examples of questions which might be approached in this 
manner come readily to mind. In an elegant exercise in the applica-
tion of statistical theory to a legal problem, Michael 0. Finkelstein 
has demonstrated that a quantitative test can be used to prove 
whether or not discriminatory techniques were used in the selection 
of juries.47 Alfred F. Conard has shown how quantitative analyses 
of automobile personal injury litigations wholly changes the lawyer's 
view of the nature of the problem.48 Quantitative techniques could 
be used, for example, to determine whether a particular type of 
automobile was properly designed; the examination of a large 
enough sample of accidents involving various types of automobiles 
may reveal whether or not a particular type is more accident-prone 
than others. If such a pattern did exist, and if other factors were 
investigated and rejected as the cause of the pattern, this would 
show that it is the particular type of automobile that is at fault. If 
no such pattern emerged, the opposite would seem to be proved, 
that is, that the particular automobile design was no worse than 
others. 
The necessity of accumulating a large body of experimental data 
makes quantitative analysis an expensive game. So does the use of 
sophisticated computers, not to mention the cost of sophisticated ex-
perts. Clients may boggle at the cost of preparing a "big case," but 
they are usually so concerned with winning it that they will sign the 
· necessary checks. 
Quantitative analysis is not merely a mechanical or statistical 
process, although a statistical technique and the manipulation of 
large bodies of data are among its necessary elements. The exercise 
of intelligence in the formulation of the problem and in the inter-
pretation of the statistical results is also necessary. It is in these areas 
that the lawyer must contribute to the analysis. His understanding 
of the legal context of the problem and of the nuances of the factual 
situation must be brought to bear if the results are to be useful. 
Our principal concern thus far has been the use of quantitative 
analysis in the resolution of complicated factual questions, concen-
trating on its use in litigation of the "big case." For the practicing 
lawyer, this is likely to be its most important immediate applica-
tion. However, the legal profession is concerned in the long run 
with improving the law as well as applying it. Quantitative analysis 
47. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Dis-
crimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 3!!8 (1966). 
48. Conard, The Quantitative Analysis of Justice, 20 J. LEGAL ED. I (1967). 
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has an imporant role to play in this process: it can assist in evalu-
ating the effects, and the effectiveness, of our legal system. 
For example, it is obvious that the antitrust laws are based at 
least in part on economic theories which assume that certain types 
of market structures or behavioral rules will yield desirable economic 
performance in the real world. The antitrust laws are presumably 
designed to foster a competitive system and thus to achieve an effi-
cient use of resources. In the Continental Bank case, quantitative 
analysis was used to describe, we believe with considerable sophisti-
cation, the structure of banking markets in the American economy. 
However, economists have already begun to use these techniques to 
investigate the more fundamental question of the relationship be-
tween particular kinds of market structures and the performance of 
markets.49 This research has, thus far, been largely inconclusive. At-
tempts have been made, for example, to relate bank concentration 
ratios in various cities to the level of interest rates paid on savings 
deposits or charged on bank loans in such cities. Thus far the 
economists have been content to measure concentration ratios by 
the raw balance sheet figures which our studies in the Continental 
Bank case show to be potentially misleading. Hopefully, some of 
this research will be repeated using the insights gained from our 
work. 
In time, if such quantitative research into the operation of 
economic markets is refined and expanded, it may be possible to 
develop rules of market behavior and standards of market structure 
which will in fact lead to important improvements in economic per-
formance. Furthermore, the very process of achieving such knowl-
edge would necessarily entail a refinement of concepts such as "mar-
ket," "concentration," or "trend." Hopefully, these refinements 
could be administered with some objectivity and an even hand; 
at present, we suffer an almost random application of confusing-
even though often overly precise-standards. 
This is only one example of a part of our legal structure which 
could be refined by the use of quantitative analysis. There are many 
others. In many areas, the research lawyer or the law professor will 
want to enlist the cooperation of other social scientists-the econo-
mist, the sociologist, and the political scientist-as well as that of 
~9. See, e.g., Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, !$ NAT'L BANKING 
REv. 1 (1965); Edwards, Concentration in Banking and Its Effect on Business Loan 
Rates, 46 REv. OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 294 (1964); Flechsig, The Effect of Con-
centration on Bank Loan Rates, 20 J. OF FINANCE 298 (1965). 
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the statistical analyst. However, the lawyer, if he makes the effort 
necessary to understand the techniques, will find that he can bring 
his own special legal insights to bear on the solution of these prob-
lems. 
